Xung đột từ 1973 tới 2011

China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict

CNN - June 28, 2011.

 

Hanoi's embrace of one-time foe the U.S. and growing rancor with Vietnam War-era ally China may appear surprising, but the two nations share a long and complicated history of territorial disputes. Vietnam and China, who established formal ties in 1950, have had border differences that trace back to the 1950's. These disputes were deferred while Beijing's southern neighbor was battling a civil war, and the U.S. entry into the conflict tied Northern Vietnam more closely to Beijing. As the Vietnam war wound down, however, territorial disputes began anew. 

1973 -- Hanoi announces to Beijing its intentions to negotiate contracts with foreign firms for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin, part of the South China Sea. The disputed islands in the South China Sea assume importance only after it is disclosed that they are near the potential sites of substantial offshore oil deposits.

January 1974 -- Chinese military units seize islands in the Paracels occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and Beijing claims sovereignty over the Spratlys.

Spring 1975 -- South Vietnam occupies part of the Spratly Islands.

1976 -- North and South Vietnam unify.

1978 -- Vietnam's treatment of the Hoa people - an ethnic Chinese group - becomes an issue when Hanoi institutes a crackdown on the Chinese community because of its pervasive role in domestic commerce in the South and its alleged subversive activities in the North. Vietnam's actions force an unprecedented exodus of thousands of Hoa across the border into China.

November 1978 -- Sino-Vietnam relations worsen when the Soviet Union and Vietnam sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that calls for mutual assistance and consultation in the event of a security threat to either country.

February to March 1979 -- In the Sino-Vietnamese Border War, China launches the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ends the reign of the China-backed Khmer Rouge. This becomes China's largest military operation since the Korean War.

1985 -- Throughout most of 1985 and into the early months of 1986, Vietnam's border provinces are subject to intense artillery and mortar shelling. China issues vague threats to Vietnam of a "second lesson" over the stalemate with Cambodia.

1988 -- China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Spratly Islands. 70 Vietnamese sailors are killed.

November 1991 -- China and Vietnam normalize relations after more than a decade of hostility.

December 1999 -- The two countries sign the Land Border Treaty.

December 2000 -- Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve a long-standing territorial dispute over the resource rich Gulf of Tonkin. The agreements demarcate territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, as well as outlining regulations for fisheries.

May 2003 -- The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issues a "sovereignty" declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam had undisputed "sovereignty" rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands.

May 25, 2011 -- A Vietnamese ship has its cables cut by Chinese patrol boats while conducting a underwater survey of the South China Sea.

June 9, 2011 -- Vietnam's foreign ministry says a Chinese fishing boat supported by two Chinese naval patrol craft cut a cable being used by a seismic survey craft operated by state-run energy company PetroVietnam.

June 13, 2011 -- Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea amid high tensions with China over disputed waters.

 

Vẫn tìm dầu, cho dù xung đột: bài viết trên The Australian

Oil and gas players shrug off Chinese naval drills 

• Paul Garve - From: The Australian; July 04, 2011

EVERY Sunday for the past few weeks, protesters have taken to the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam chanting "down with China".

China's navy has been carrying out highly publicised naval exercises along the disputed maritime border it shares with Vietnam, and the country's state-owned newspapers have been running evocative editorials warning that it will "show no mercy" should Vietnam wish to start a war in the South China Sea. At the heart of the escalating tensions is the increasing excitement about the oil and gas prospects in the water off Vietnam's coastline, where a number of Australian companies are active.

For those Australian companies with prospects in and around those waters, the tensions, unsettling as they are, are nevertheless a ringing endorsement of the potential that attracted them to Vietnam in the first place.

Australian oil and gas stalwarts Santos and Origin Energy are both exploring there, while junior player Neon Energy is sitting on two of the more interesting pieces of acreage in the region. All the companies are aware of the tensions but don't allow them to slow their exploration efforts. The aggressive rhetoric between China and Vietnam comes at a sensitive time, particularly for Neon, which is sitting on oil and gas prospects that could transform the company.

Neon is on the hunt for a joint venture partner that will carry the bulk of the cost of testing some of its best targets.

So far, the tensions appear to have done little to dampen third-party interest in the acreage. Indeed, China wouldn't be so interested in the territory were its oil and gas prospects not so attractive.

Territorial disputes between China and its neighbours in the South China Sea are nothing new, with the boundaries around the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands north of Malaysia disputed for decades. The latest tensions, however, revolve around a relatively new area.

The latest flare-up between China and Vietnam began just before 6am on May 26 in the waters just southeast of the blocks held by Neon and Origin and northeast of Santos's 50 per cent owned Block 123. The Binh Minh 2, a survey ship owned by Vietnam's state-owned energy giant PetroVietnam, was carrying out a seismic survey in the waters when it was reportedly rushed by three Chinese patrol ships.

A number of seismic cables attached to the Binh Minh 2 were damaged in the incident. Relations between the two countries have been strained ever since.

Chinese media has been releasing details of recent naval exercises near the Vietnamese waters, including mine sweeping and missile tests, as well as beach landings at Hainan island.

Equally provocative was an editorial in the Chinese state-owned Global Times, which said: "If Vietnam wishes to create a war in the South China Sea, China will resolutely keep them company. China has the absolute might to crush the naval fleets sent from Vietnam. China will show no mercy to its rival due to 'global impact' concerns."

Against that backdrop is Neon's hunt for joint venture partners for its two Vietnamese licences, Block 105 and Block 120.

While Block 105 is not in dispute, Neon managing director Ken Charminsky estimates that the eastern one-fifth of Block 120 falls in the area of the recent controversy. Neon and its existing partner in the project, private group Kris Energy, have focused all their efforts to date in the western half of the block, away from the disputed area.

Independent consultant Netherland Sewell & Associates has identified a dozen oil leads in the block capable of hosting up to an impressive combined total of 7.9 billion barrels of oil, with a most likely estimate of 2.7 billion barrels. That is a tremendous potential target, particularly for a junior Perth-based explorer such as Neon.

Block 105 is just as enticing, with NSA identifying seven prospects it estimated could host 6.3 trillion cubic feet of gas and 46.3 million barrels of condensate on a most likely basis, and a possible 21 trillion cubic feet of gas and 177 million barrels of condensate.

The highest priority target, Ca Lang, has a most likely target of 461 million barrels and a best case estimate of 1.3 billion barrels.

"For a company of our size, when you think about the impact a discovery of that magnitude would have for us, even a large multinational could be pleased with that," Charminsky says from London.

Southern Cross Equities analyst Johan Hedstrom rates the prospects a 10-20 per cent chance of success and says just one success could be worth between 57c and $1.70 a Neon share.

Neon, which already operates some small but profitable oilfields in the US, trades around 39.5c a share.
"Companies like Woodside, Santos and Oil Search would love to have such potential in their portfolios, which does raise the risk of a takeover for Neon," Hedstrom says.

"Australian companies are probably not the main threat, but big companies like Exxon Mobil, which is drilling next door, would probably consider taking out Neon rather than doing a farm-in for 50 per cent."

The possible upside means there has already been a strong stream of inquiries from larger oil and gas players interested in funding the bulk of drilling costs on the blocks in return for an interest.

Despite or maybe because of the China controversy, Neon has had dozens of parties at the blocks' online data room and a handful of majors at the physical data rooms that have recently opened in Singapore and Perth. Neon is aiming to finalise a deal in six months and start drilling early next year.

Many of the world's oil and gas majors are already active in Vietnam, such as Exxon (which is preparing to drill a well on the block immediately north of Neon's Block 120), Chevron, Total and Gazprom.
Malaysian oil and gas giant Petronas last week announced a new oil discovery at its Diamond field off southern Vietnam, which is flowing at 5200 barrels of oil a day.

Origin Energy, which owns and operates Block 121, immediately south of Neon's Block 120, is pushing ahead with its work programs in Vietnam.

Santos has previously said it planned to drill the Tuy Hoa prospect on Block 123 in early 2011, but there has been no update on this plan.

Emerging cold war in the Spratlys

By Rommel C. Banlaoi (June 24, 2011) MANILA, Philippines -- In an official meeting with Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario on 23 June 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton assured that the US is committed to defend the Philippines amidst rising security tensions in the South China Sea, which the Philippine government now calls as West Philippine Sea.

To operationalize this commitment, Secretary Clinton stressed that the US would provide the Philippines affordable and reliable military equipment in order to enhance the external defense capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particularly in defending its territories in West Philippines Sea. The AFP is now preparing a “shopping list” of military hardware it wants from the US.

So far, these words of Secretary Clinton are the most reassuring statements ever expressed by a top US official on the state of Philippines-American security relations.

Since 1951, the Philippines and the US have been military allies through the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). This placed the Philippines on the side of the US in the cold war against the former Soviet Union.

But their strong military relations became practically moribund with the termination in 1991 of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). The termination of MBA coincided with end of the cold war between the US and the former Soviet Union. When the US withdrew its last remaining troops from Clark and Subic in 1992, their military relations reached its lowest moment leading to the rapid deterioration not only of Philippines-American alliance but also of Philippine military capabilities.

China took advantage of this moment when it passed a law in 1992 declaring the whole of South China Sea as part of its internal waters. US reaction was ambiguous and underscored that it would remain neutral on the Spratly issue.

However, Chinese occupation of the Panganiban (Mischief) Reef in 1995 prompted the US and the Philippines to fashion a new type of military relationship in order to respond to a China challenge in the Spratlys. In 1999, the Philippine Senate ratified the Philippines-American Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to justify the presence of American troops conducting joint and combined military exercises with the AFP in Philippine territories. The VFA is said to have provided operational substance to the MDT, which serves as the cornerstone of Philippines-American security alliance.

Despite the signing of the VFA, the US maintained its “strategic ambiguities” on the Spratly issue and declared its “hands off” position on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

While the VFA renewed Philippines-American security relations, it failed to actually revive their military alliance. The China challenge in the Panganiban Reef at that time was not enough justification for US troops to become visibly involved in Philippine security.

Things changed in 2001 when the US used the VFA to justify American presence in the Philippines as part of the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

The GWOT reinvigorated the once dormant Philippines-American alliance. The GWOT even led to the signing of the Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA) in 2002 and the establishment of US Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTFP) Headquarters in Zamboanga City thereafter. The threat of terrorism, therefore, encouraged the Philippines and the US to work closely together.

China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea is now being viewed in the Philippines and the US not only as a security challenge, but more of a military threat. This is the context on why Secretary Clinton strongly expressed US commitment to defend the Philippines amidst tensions in the Spratlys.

Secretary Clinton’s statement indicates the emerging cold war between the US and China in the Spratlys.
A cold war is a situation where at least two major powers are involved in a security tension and subdued military hostility short of an actual military battle. Conflicts are expressed through proxy wars, military coalitions, propaganda, espionage, and even trade competitions. This situation is now emerging between the US and China in the contested Spratly group of islands.

Indications of an emerging cold war in the Spratly started to manifest in March 2009 when five Chinese ships “harassed” USS Impeccable, a US Navy minesweeper. The Chinese government claimed that the US ship was intruding in China’s internal water, which was regarded by the US government as an international water where all ships can enjoy free or innocent passage.

The emerging cold war between the US and China on the Spratly issue is also manifested in the exchange of words between the two powers in various international forums like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Shangrila Dialogue, and various meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) involving the two powers.

The US exclaims that the US has a national security interest in the South China Sea. China, on the other hand, asserts that the South China Sea forms part of its core interests at par with Taiwan and Tibet. China, which says that it remains committed to the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts, wants the US out of the South China Sea Disputes. But the US reiterates its willingness to get involved in the peaceful management of disputes in the Spratly while assuring its allies in the region of US military assistance.

The Philippines is now inevitably involved in an emerging cold war between the US and China in the Spratly. As an American ally, the Philippines is apparently on the side of the US in this emerging situation.

But will the Philippine government allows itself to get involved in a proxy war between the US and China when the cold war in the Spratly reaches its peak?

This situation is something that all sovereign states have to prevent to happen.

Quả này cực hay, mời đọc kỹ: Vietnam's Dr Strangelove at war with the Mandarins

By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING - After the recent publication of a Chinese document [1], many people sent new ones. Most were not interesting; one, however, caught my attention. The person who gave it to me is a Westerner who had just come back from Hanoi.

There, after a business meeting, a junior official fumbled around his desk, took some papers, made them into a ball, and threw them in the wastebasket whispering "nonsense". He missed, and the ball rolled onto my friend's feet. He picked it up and pocketed it while the official turned to look out the window. He then kindly translated it from Vietnamese for me.

They are apparently the outbursts of an old Vietnamese war veteran, possibly just released from some mental institution. It is a raving mind, a Doctor Strangelove, like many around the world at all times. It is impossible to take the arguments seriously, but they make a nice joke, and in this spirit I wanted to present it - for a laugh after a long day's work.

Here they are, reproduced in full:

You, youngsters, must not waver, not release your grip, and most of all not be scared by China. The contrast between our relative sizes makes it the perfect occasion and time for our vendetta. The Chinese have forgotten the basics of strategy despite their pride in their strategic tradition. They are trapped in the South China Sea, and they are going to lose anyway while we are going to win. It is only ours to lose, so you do not have to give up. You have to insist, and press ahead - then we can get our revenge for their 1979 invasion.

China's decision to organize military drills in the South China Sea and step up the level of confrontation in the region guarantees their failure, provided we do not give in and respond in kind. We have, in fact, to aim for a military clash with them, the larger the better, and then we will win in any scenario. The general situation has dramatically changed in the past couple of months since the Philippines decided to challenge China's role at sea. The Philippines is a former American colony, still close to the US heart. And, unlike us, its people are not considered quarrelsome. If they react, this may be proof enough to the Western world that the Chinese have gone too far. Then this is our moment to step in and stop being pushed around by the Chinese navy, which captures our fishing vessels and holds our sailors for ransom.

If our navy loses a clash with them, we will have a political victory anyway. China's aggressive and bellicose behavior will scare everybody in the world. It will prove that their theory of "Peaceful Development" is a ruse for gullible foreigners; both domestic and foreign capital will start to flee China; suspicion will grow surrounding China; and the economic and trade atmosphere with China will worsen. It is clear that China, being the bigger country, has greater responsibility to maintain peace around its borders. If it doesn't manage to do so with us, small Vietnam, what can it do with Japan, India, or Russia? Everybody will see they are the warmongers, they will be scared, and we will be the victims to be comforted and helped by everybody.

If we win the clash, we will prove that they are just a paper tiger. We will still have a political victory - plus a military success. We will be the David who has triumphed over the ferocious Goliath, and the consequences for China will be pretty much the same as if we lose.

This is the strategy we adopted against America during our war of resistance against them. We knew they would inevitably politically lose the war, despite any military victory, as long as we managed to show the people of the world - and the American people as well - that we were fighting for the liberation of our country and nothing else. Similarly, now we can show that we are fighting for a part of the sea very close to our coasts and far from Chinese shores. This geographical proximity, reinforced by our small size, may prove to the world our right to that sea.

In sum, we will win in any case and get the benefits China enjoyed with their invasion against us in 1979. After that Chinese attack, conducted at the behest of the Americans, China proved it was squarely in the Western camp. China showed to be ready to take concrete actions to stem the Soviet penetration in Asia by trying to stymie us while we were involved in our effort to liberate Cambodia from the hands of the nefarious and pro-China Khmer Rouge. China was rewarded for that attack with a political green light from the US for investment and the sale of technology. The following flow of investments enabled China's early phase of development. The support for investment basically never stopped, not even after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. China's growth and development would have been impossible without that early go-ahead.

In other words, the 1979 war opened the gates for China's development. Without that war, development would have been impossible or very difficult.

The lesson was: fight with the US and you will be rewarded; go against the US and you will be politically punished. Yet, the Chinese seem to have forgotten that lesson or simply do not understand the new general political atmosphere around China. Everybody in Asia is scared about China's growth. China's economy is now bigger than Japan's, and this is a warning sign for the whole world - including America. There are growing voices calling for a coordinated effort to contain China. Yet there is no decision on what to do, as there is still doubt about China's real intentions and strategy. A clash with tiny Vietnam would show the world that China is truly aggressive and can't be trusted.

All of this would be to our advantage: Before the world, we would be the ones who stopped mighty China - just like 40 years ago we stopped the Asian expansion of imperialistic America.

The time is ripe for this.

In recent days, even the Philippines came out arguing against China's encroachment in the area. It started calling that sea the West Philippine Sea and called for US involvement the area. After a clash, the US will have to decide to take sides, and it certainly can't side against its former colony, the Philippines; nor can it side with the gigantic rising local bully, China, which is intimidating its small neighbors with military drills, as if its massive size or its fast economic growth were not scary enough.

If the US will then side with us, the momentum of China's fast economic growth will have to halt as very few people in the world will want to do business with a country bullying its neighbors - especially before it has the largest economy in the world. The message will be: What will China do to its neighbors, business partners, and really anybody when becomes even more powerful? It will be a worse bully than America without even the veneer or pretense of human rights. Who would want this kind of future for the world? Then global investment will move somewhere else, and we shall be rewarded for our pivotal role in stopping the growth of the ugly giant.

This future is within our grasp.

To prevent this future, China should organize a large regional initiative to solve the South China Sea problems and do it modestly, without a sense of wounded pride. It should also move its claim from historical to legal grounds, which are more understandable to the world. China's leaders should beg the Americans to stop us, or anybody stirring trouble with provocative actions. But by doing this, they would have everybody, including the US, officially involved in an area they claim as theirs. This is something they are unwilling to do because it would increase foreign involvement in what they believe to be internal affairs.

In fact, by renouncing this strategy and remaining basically hostage to different domestic constituencies vying for political turf, they fail to grasp the essence of modern politics. Here the old divide between internal and international affairs grows smaller by the day for everybody - especially for larger players like America or China. By trying to keep domestic something that is objectively international, they fall into a trap from which there is no way out.

Moreover, China misses another important point. All countries are looking for American protection against the rise of a new and still mysterious China. Despite all qualms and doubts one might have about America, the US is still the old, known power - everybody is acquainted with it. Therefore, everybody will seek the US protection against secretive newcomer China. Then the US, despite all the possible goodwill it might feel toward China, cannot just cast away all other countries' interests and fears in order to defend Beijing. If some small, peaceful country - one formerly part of America itself, as a colony - shouts out against China, how can the US ignore it and stay aloof, just because, say, in this controversy old friend Taiwan sides with Beijing?

For this reason, we have a unique chance to change the world and even become the driving player in the region. We only have to be determined and brave, and we will be rewarded just as we managed to defeat the French and the Americans.

(Please do not believe for one minute there is a gram of truth in all of this - it is just a hoax.)

Note
1. Sharp relief for a flat world, Asia Times Online, June 9, 2011.

Francesco Sisci is a columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be reached at fsisci@gmail.com

(Copyright 2011 Francesco Sisci.)

Làm đúng việc trước; Làm việc hiệu quả sau

Sự kiện tàu hải giám Trung Quốc vi phạm chủ quyền lãnh hải của Việt Nam thu hút tập trung quan tâm của công chúng. Hệ thống truyền thông cũng rất tích cực lên tiếng bảo vệ quyền lợi chính đáng của Việt Nam.

Trước một tình huống phức tạp như thế này, sự tỉnh táo và lạnh lùng của những bộ CPU điều hành là vô cùng cần thiết. Xác định đúng việc cần làm và trình tự triển khai là yêu cầu trước tiên.

Đã có rất nhiều bài viết và ý kiến được giới thiệu trên các trang báo. Tuy nhiên, chưa có nhiều lập luận chỉ ra rõ ràng lợi ích chung của Việt Nam, Trung Quốc, và cả ASEAN, cũng như các đối tác quốc tế liên quan khác khi vùng biển Đông duy trì được trật tự và bầu không khí hợp tác.

Hẳn nhiên, Việt Nam không mong muốn sự cố với tàu Bình Minh 02 lặp lại, lại càng không muốn xung đột với Trung Quốc trở nên căng thẳng hơn.

Những bài viết kiểu như thế này thực sự không cần thiết.

Việt Nam sắm máy bay trinh sát, tuần tra biển (Vietnamnet dẫn nguồn Đất Việt, ngày 2-6)

Ngắm dàn vũ khí chiến hạm Đinh Tiên Hoàng (Vietnamanet dẫn nguồn Đất Việt, ngày 31-5)

Trung Quốc giúp đỡ hay đang chiếm đoạt châu Phi? (Vietnamnet, dịch từ The Economist. Đây là bài hay nhưng thời điểm xuất hiện có nên vào lúc này?)