Xung đột từ 1973 tới 2011

China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict

CNN - June 28, 2011.

 

Hanoi's embrace of one-time foe the U.S. and growing rancor with Vietnam War-era ally China may appear surprising, but the two nations share a long and complicated history of territorial disputes. Vietnam and China, who established formal ties in 1950, have had border differences that trace back to the 1950's. These disputes were deferred while Beijing's southern neighbor was battling a civil war, and the U.S. entry into the conflict tied Northern Vietnam more closely to Beijing. As the Vietnam war wound down, however, territorial disputes began anew. 

1973 -- Hanoi announces to Beijing its intentions to negotiate contracts with foreign firms for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin, part of the South China Sea. The disputed islands in the South China Sea assume importance only after it is disclosed that they are near the potential sites of substantial offshore oil deposits.

January 1974 -- Chinese military units seize islands in the Paracels occupied by South Vietnamese armed forces, and Beijing claims sovereignty over the Spratlys.

Spring 1975 -- South Vietnam occupies part of the Spratly Islands.

1976 -- North and South Vietnam unify.

1978 -- Vietnam's treatment of the Hoa people - an ethnic Chinese group - becomes an issue when Hanoi institutes a crackdown on the Chinese community because of its pervasive role in domestic commerce in the South and its alleged subversive activities in the North. Vietnam's actions force an unprecedented exodus of thousands of Hoa across the border into China.

November 1978 -- Sino-Vietnam relations worsen when the Soviet Union and Vietnam sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that calls for mutual assistance and consultation in the event of a security threat to either country.

February to March 1979 -- In the Sino-Vietnamese Border War, China launches the offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia, which ends the reign of the China-backed Khmer Rouge. This becomes China's largest military operation since the Korean War.

1985 -- Throughout most of 1985 and into the early months of 1986, Vietnam's border provinces are subject to intense artillery and mortar shelling. China issues vague threats to Vietnam of a "second lesson" over the stalemate with Cambodia.

1988 -- China and Vietnam fight a naval battle just off the Spratly Islands. 70 Vietnamese sailors are killed.

November 1991 -- China and Vietnam normalize relations after more than a decade of hostility.

December 1999 -- The two countries sign the Land Border Treaty.

December 2000 -- Vietnam and China sign two agreements to resolve a long-standing territorial dispute over the resource rich Gulf of Tonkin. The agreements demarcate territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, as well as outlining regulations for fisheries.

May 2003 -- The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issues a "sovereignty" declaration on the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam had undisputed "sovereignty" rights over the Paracel and Spratly islands.

May 25, 2011 -- A Vietnamese ship has its cables cut by Chinese patrol boats while conducting a underwater survey of the South China Sea.

June 9, 2011 -- Vietnam's foreign ministry says a Chinese fishing boat supported by two Chinese naval patrol craft cut a cable being used by a seismic survey craft operated by state-run energy company PetroVietnam.

June 13, 2011 -- Vietnam holds live-fire drills in the South China Sea amid high tensions with China over disputed waters.

 

Vẫn tìm dầu, cho dù xung đột: bài viết trên The Australian

Oil and gas players shrug off Chinese naval drills 

• Paul Garve - From: The Australian; July 04, 2011

EVERY Sunday for the past few weeks, protesters have taken to the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam chanting "down with China".

China's navy has been carrying out highly publicised naval exercises along the disputed maritime border it shares with Vietnam, and the country's state-owned newspapers have been running evocative editorials warning that it will "show no mercy" should Vietnam wish to start a war in the South China Sea. At the heart of the escalating tensions is the increasing excitement about the oil and gas prospects in the water off Vietnam's coastline, where a number of Australian companies are active.

For those Australian companies with prospects in and around those waters, the tensions, unsettling as they are, are nevertheless a ringing endorsement of the potential that attracted them to Vietnam in the first place.

Australian oil and gas stalwarts Santos and Origin Energy are both exploring there, while junior player Neon Energy is sitting on two of the more interesting pieces of acreage in the region. All the companies are aware of the tensions but don't allow them to slow their exploration efforts. The aggressive rhetoric between China and Vietnam comes at a sensitive time, particularly for Neon, which is sitting on oil and gas prospects that could transform the company.

Neon is on the hunt for a joint venture partner that will carry the bulk of the cost of testing some of its best targets.

So far, the tensions appear to have done little to dampen third-party interest in the acreage. Indeed, China wouldn't be so interested in the territory were its oil and gas prospects not so attractive.

Territorial disputes between China and its neighbours in the South China Sea are nothing new, with the boundaries around the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands north of Malaysia disputed for decades. The latest tensions, however, revolve around a relatively new area.

The latest flare-up between China and Vietnam began just before 6am on May 26 in the waters just southeast of the blocks held by Neon and Origin and northeast of Santos's 50 per cent owned Block 123. The Binh Minh 2, a survey ship owned by Vietnam's state-owned energy giant PetroVietnam, was carrying out a seismic survey in the waters when it was reportedly rushed by three Chinese patrol ships.

A number of seismic cables attached to the Binh Minh 2 were damaged in the incident. Relations between the two countries have been strained ever since.

Chinese media has been releasing details of recent naval exercises near the Vietnamese waters, including mine sweeping and missile tests, as well as beach landings at Hainan island.

Equally provocative was an editorial in the Chinese state-owned Global Times, which said: "If Vietnam wishes to create a war in the South China Sea, China will resolutely keep them company. China has the absolute might to crush the naval fleets sent from Vietnam. China will show no mercy to its rival due to 'global impact' concerns."

Against that backdrop is Neon's hunt for joint venture partners for its two Vietnamese licences, Block 105 and Block 120.

While Block 105 is not in dispute, Neon managing director Ken Charminsky estimates that the eastern one-fifth of Block 120 falls in the area of the recent controversy. Neon and its existing partner in the project, private group Kris Energy, have focused all their efforts to date in the western half of the block, away from the disputed area.

Independent consultant Netherland Sewell & Associates has identified a dozen oil leads in the block capable of hosting up to an impressive combined total of 7.9 billion barrels of oil, with a most likely estimate of 2.7 billion barrels. That is a tremendous potential target, particularly for a junior Perth-based explorer such as Neon.

Block 105 is just as enticing, with NSA identifying seven prospects it estimated could host 6.3 trillion cubic feet of gas and 46.3 million barrels of condensate on a most likely basis, and a possible 21 trillion cubic feet of gas and 177 million barrels of condensate.

The highest priority target, Ca Lang, has a most likely target of 461 million barrels and a best case estimate of 1.3 billion barrels.

"For a company of our size, when you think about the impact a discovery of that magnitude would have for us, even a large multinational could be pleased with that," Charminsky says from London.

Southern Cross Equities analyst Johan Hedstrom rates the prospects a 10-20 per cent chance of success and says just one success could be worth between 57c and $1.70 a Neon share.

Neon, which already operates some small but profitable oilfields in the US, trades around 39.5c a share.
"Companies like Woodside, Santos and Oil Search would love to have such potential in their portfolios, which does raise the risk of a takeover for Neon," Hedstrom says.

"Australian companies are probably not the main threat, but big companies like Exxon Mobil, which is drilling next door, would probably consider taking out Neon rather than doing a farm-in for 50 per cent."

The possible upside means there has already been a strong stream of inquiries from larger oil and gas players interested in funding the bulk of drilling costs on the blocks in return for an interest.

Despite or maybe because of the China controversy, Neon has had dozens of parties at the blocks' online data room and a handful of majors at the physical data rooms that have recently opened in Singapore and Perth. Neon is aiming to finalise a deal in six months and start drilling early next year.

Many of the world's oil and gas majors are already active in Vietnam, such as Exxon (which is preparing to drill a well on the block immediately north of Neon's Block 120), Chevron, Total and Gazprom.
Malaysian oil and gas giant Petronas last week announced a new oil discovery at its Diamond field off southern Vietnam, which is flowing at 5200 barrels of oil a day.

Origin Energy, which owns and operates Block 121, immediately south of Neon's Block 120, is pushing ahead with its work programs in Vietnam.

Santos has previously said it planned to drill the Tuy Hoa prospect on Block 123 in early 2011, but there has been no update on this plan.

Why Greeks are Angry, Scared and Trapped

Greece, Banking, European Union, Europe

William J. Antholis, Managing Director, The Brookings Institution

CNN

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June 29, 2011 — The near-tragedy unfolding on the streets of Athens could be a comedy, if the possible consequences were not so dire.

With Europe pushing austerity measures on Greece in exchange for another round of bailouts, the Greek public in the streets responds with chants: "We won't pay." Faced with pain and suffering, they are contemplating suicide.

It is almost as if the script was lifted from Mel Brooks' film "Blazing Saddles." Cleavon Little's character faces a gun-wielding mob about to run him out of town -- or worse. To escape, he puts his gun to his own head and threatens to shoot unless members of the mob drop their guns first.

In this case, Europe is tired of bailing out Greece, having already done so once. In the Netherlands and Finland, nationalist parties have even called for Greece to leave the euro, angry that previous Greek governments lied to them about their level of deficit. That debt allowed Greece to bloat its federal payroll, with more than one in five Greeks employed by the government or a state-owned enterprise.

But that debt also allowed Greece to go on a shopping spree of European goods. Greeks built new highways and subways and natural gas buses, not to mention expensive military equipment -- largely imported from northern European companies and contractors.

Greece's mounting unpaid loans are owed, to a great degree, to European banks. If Greece doesn't make those payments, Europe's banks are in trouble. So Greece faces a choice -- balance its budget to free up cash to make debt payments, or refuse to pay and put Europe's financial system at risk.

Greece's government under Prime Minister George Papandreou, so far, has mostly done the right thing. Papandreou has owned up to Greece's past mistakes. More than that, the government has begun to cut wages, cut pensions and raise taxes. The newest measures -- approved in Parliament on Wednesday -- will start to sell off some publicly owned companies and land, and further raise taxes and cut spending.

Still, many outsiders -- and not a few insiders -- doubt that austerity will generate enough extra revenues to make debt payments well into the future.

Without sustained growth, it is hard for most foreign financial analysts to see where the Greeks will come up with the cash to make payments on their debt.

Sustained growth will only happen when the government takes an ax to the knots of bureaucratic red tape that hamper even the simplest of business transactions. But the benefits of that kind of reform could take years to materialize.

Policymakers in Greece and throughout the European Union have yet to offer a near-term vision for how to jump-start the Greek economy. As a result, there is no real constituency for reform.

Greeks don't want cutbacks in public sector jobs if they can't see the private sector jobs that would replace them. They don't want to sell state-owned companies if it is not clear that privately held companies would be more successful. With so many Greeks on the public payroll, everyone in Greece either fears losing his job, or fears that his brother, or aunt, or neighbor or client will lose theirs.

In short, Greece's public is angry and scared. The Greeks are angry, because they've been lied to by their politicians, and scolded by European bureaucrats. They're scared, because the current slate of reforms will, in the short term, only make matters worse. Even small businesses -- which might be expected to support reform -- are convinced that their taxes will increase, that they will lose customers, and that they will continue to be strangled with regulation.

The public also knows that Europe fears a sovereign default. Many Greeks are willing to hold out on payments until Europe comes through with more loans or perhaps more stimulus.

What these Greeks don't realize is that the way they are holding Europe hostage is by threatening suicide.

To begin with, the biggest holders of Greek debt are Greek banks. If Greek banks fail, every Greek with a checking or savings account loses. Worse still, international faith in Greek businesses would be lost.

Many of the gains from economic integration over the last 25 years would be reversed, including the transformation of Greece from being nearly a Third World country to having a fully modern economy (albeit a quirky, over-regulated one).

If Greece exits the European Union, many young Greeks would lose the opportunity to travel freely in Europe to study or work and improve their standard of living. And European investment in Greece would halt.

The crisis will only end when policymakers throughout Europe recognize the nature of the challenge they face. Europe and Greece must find a way of making Greek debts sustainable while also generating prolonged economic growth throughout the EU. This will require shared sacrifice and a shared commitment to reform. When policymakers face the truth of the tragedy they are facing, everyone will finally put his guns down.

As Number One, China to Face Hour of Choice

Richard C. Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies

YaleGlobal

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June 30, 2011 —

Recently the International Monetary Fund confirmed what the average Chinese has long anticipated: China will soon have the world’s largest economy, surpassing the United States. There may be quibbles about measuring sticks and low per capita GDP, so timing is imprecise. But the trend is clear. In terms of gross domestic product, China will become number one in this decade or the next and the United States will become number two. Yet rankings do not automatically confer power and influence. More important is how a major country chooses to use its power, for good or ill.

That China will have the world’s largest economy is a remarkable achievement. In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party came to power, China was a very poor country, the result of more than a century of decline. Thirty years later, it was still a poor country, wracked by continual political turmoil. But China’s leaders then abandoned central planning and autarky in favor of export-led growth fueled by external investment and local initiative. They stuck to that strategy while adapting skillfully to changing circumstances. They improved the living standards of hundreds of millions and transformed the face of the country

This milestone is as important psychologically as it is economically. Chinese take pride in their civilization.They believe that their country, in its weakened state, was victimized for more than a century by the countries of the West plus Japan. To restore China to its past glory and position as one of the world’s great powers would right those wrongs. That this growing power is coming at the expense of the United States, with which China at best has had a difficult relationship for much of the last 60 years, is particularly sweet.

Some Chinese believe that passing this milestone will have automatic consequences for international politics, giving China more international influence. In their view, other countries should then confer more deference on China and accommodate to it on issues that China regards as important, rather than China continuing to accommodate them. At some point, Beijing will likely insist that the head of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank be a Chinese.

Discussions of China’s having the largest GDP come with a subtext – that rapid rise of a new power can destabilize the international system and even lead to conflict. Economic power can be translated into military power and political influence.

But as history shows, the path may not have a single destination. According to the conventional narrative, Germany challenged Great Britain’s dominant position in the international system and World War I was the result. Yet this narrative is at odds with the economic rankings at that time, according to estimates of the late Angus Maddison, a prominent economic historian.

In 1913, the year before the outbreak of World War I, the United States had the world’s largest GDP, with just more than USD500 billion in 1990 prices. Next, four countries were bunched together, each with UDS225 to USD240 billion. Germany and Great Britain were in this group but so were Russia and, surprisingly, China. France was at USD144 billion and Japan only had a GDP of USD71 billion.

China’s second-tier economy is not surprising. In 1913, as today, it had the world’s largest population. More people can produce more stuff. But China then was also politically weak: divided internally and vulnerable to external imperialism.

While, of course, the world today is very different from what it was a century ago, the 1913 configuration is instructive.

First of all, the 1913 rankings demonstrate that a large economy itself does not automatically translate into global political influence. In 1913 the United States may have had the world’s largest economy, but was virtually irrelevant in Europe’s gathering storm. Great Britain, on the other hand, “punched above its weight” to preserve stability in the international system.

Second, a large economy does not necessarily result in a robust military. The United States had a comparatively small military establishment in 1913, despite having the largest GDP. Relative to their economic size, Germany and Japan had large armies and navies.

Third, the emergence of a new economic number one doesn’t mean that international conflict is inevitable. By 1913, the United States was the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, but Great Britain accepted this decline in its global influence. Japan, on the other hand, had fought and won wars against two countries three times its economic size: China in 1894-95 and Russia in 1904-05. Despite their commercial and colonial interests, however, Britain and the United States chose to accommodate Japan rather than challenge it.

Fourth, when conflict occurs, it is not necessarily because a rising power is bent on aggression. Germany’s decision to go to war in the summer of 1914 was driven by rigid alliance commitments and anxiety, probably misplaced, that Russia was growing stronger. Berlin opted to strike preemptively to preserve its security. Russia was caught in the same dilemma.

In short, the choices that major powers make are more important than their economic rank. As number one, China may assume that it has the right to extend its influence at the expense of others. Its expansion of its strategic perimeter in the East and South China seas is a case in point. Or it may continue to focus on its economy and create a prosperous life for most of its people, letting the United States continue to bear the burden of international leadership. If so, it will remain a country that has global impact, as Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, puts it, but is not a global player. Or it may opt to work with other major powers to meet the critical challenges to the international system – that is the Obama administration’s hope. Or it can read the worst into what others do, particularly the United States, and act on its fears. Which choice China makes will have profound consequences for East Asia and the world.

The United States has choices too. It can regard becoming number two as another sign that of permanent decline and retreat from international leadership. It can choose to rebuild the pillars of national power that have been neglected – government finance, education, science and technology, and so on. It can conclude – without justification – that China is sure to become America’s adversary and base policy on that fear, producing a dangerous vicious circle. Or it can forgo the temptation to read the worst into China’s revival and instead seek to influence China’s trajectory in the direction of cooperation rather than conflict.

And for each country, not making conscious choices about future direction is also a choice.

China is going to be number one, but that’s no reason for Americans to head for the hills.

YaleGlobal is the flagship publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, published since 2002.

Hy Lạp: Chương trình “thắt lưng buộc bụng” và hoạt động du lịch

5-7-2011 (Vietnamica.net) – Stratfor, hệ thống phân tích và đánh giá địa chính trị toàn cầu, gần đây có mở thêm chuyên mục mới về An Ninh Du Lịch, cung cấp thông tin, cảnh báo và chỉ dẫn khách du lịch toàn cầu các biện pháp đảm bảo an ninh. Stratfor là hệ thống cung cấp thông tin kinh doanh, bởi vậy, quyết định mở thêm chuyên mục là thông số cho thấy nhu cầu du lịch quốc tế, ít nhất là với người Mỹ, rất cao.

Tình hình kinh tế Hy Lạp cũng được nhắc tới trong một bài viết về an ninh du lịch vào ngày 4-7 như sau.

Các cuộc biểu tình phản đối chương trình “thắt lưng buộc bụng” tại Hy Lạp gần như khiến toàn bộ hoạt động của quốc gia này ngưng trệ, kể cả nhiều dịch vụ công. Trên thực tế, các phương tiện giao thông công cộng, trừ tàu điện ngầm, đều dừng hoạt động. Nhiều cơ quan chính phủ và ngân hàng đóng cửa. Cơ quan kiểm soát không lưu chỉ làm việc 4 giờ buổi sáng và 4 giờ buổi tối, một cửa quá cảnh quan trọng cũng bị đóng cửa. Lẽ tự nhiên, tình trạng này ảnh hưởng đáng kể tới hoạt động du lịch tại Hy Lạp.

Mấy đề tài có thể rất hấp dẫn về insights đối với Vietnamica

Gợi ý để khỏi quên, và suy nghĩ thêm (tôi tự đặt tên, có thể còn phải sửa, nhưng nó có tính gợi ý):

1) Vietnam's Exports in 2011 and Slim Chance of Financing the Widening Trade Gap: http://vneconomy.vn/20110705075948272P0C10/xuat-khau-nam-2011-co-the-dat-845-855-ty-usd.htm

2) Unmeasurable Underground Economy and the People's Buffer: (không có bài nào gợi ý)

3) Growing Pile of Public Spending and Option to Quit: (không có bài nào gợi ý, hay nói chính xác là quá nhiều bài gợi ý)

Crise du crédit souverain subprime : combien de milliards de dettes supplémentaires inutiles ?

A la vue de ces plans de sauvetage successifs et au-delà des débats académiques sur la liquidité, la solvabilité, la réforme nécessaire de la zone euro, la restructuration éventuelle de certaines dettes souveraines, un certain nombre de questions simples et de bon sens se posent :

Première série de questions : d'où viennent tous ces milliards ? Comment cet argent est-il finalement distribué aux Etats secourus ?

Deuxième question : ces milliards suffisent-ils à régler le problème de solvabilité des Etats concernés ?

Troisième question : ces milliards mettent-ils à l'abri les systèmes bancaires de ces pays en cas de besoins de recapitalisation urgente ?


Première question: d'où viennent ces milliards et comment cet argent est-il finalement distribué aux Etats secourus ?

A vrai dire, ces sommes ne pourraient venir que de trois sources.

Premièrement, ce pourrait être de l'argent créé par la Banque centrale européenne. Concernant ces plans d'aide, cette source n'a pas été utilisée. La Banque centrale européenne a bien émis de la monnaie pour acheter des titres d'Etat des pays périphériques en difficulté. Mais il ne s'agissait pas d'argent frais puisque ces achats ont été, pour l'essentiel, réalisés sur le marché secondaire. La BCE a racheté des obligations déjà émises sur le marché secondaire qu'elle a inscrites à son bilan.

Ceci est neutre en termes de liquidité et il n'y a pas eu de création monétaire à proprement parler puisque ces achats ont donné lieu à une stérilisation de la masse monétaire ; la monétisation des dettes périphériques a été neutralisée par des retraits de liquidité de la part de la banque centrale.

Au total, depuis juin 2010, la BCE aura acheté 75 milliards d'euros de dette périphérique sans création monétaire additionnelle, donc en maintenant quasiment inchangée la taille de son bilan.

Ceci est donc différent de ce qui s'est passé au Royaume-Uni et aux Etats-Unis.

La Bank Of England a acheté pour près de 200 milliards de livres de gilts depuis mars 2009 sans stérilisation de la masse monétaire.

La Fed a acheté pour 2 300 milliards de dollars de Treasuries et autres titres là aussi sans stérilisation. La première passe de quantitative easing entre mars 2009 et septembre 2009 s'est élevée à 1 700 milliards de dollars. La deuxième passe de quantitative easing entre novembre 2010 et juin 2011 a créé 600 milliards de dollars.

Deuxième source : l'emprunt et la mise sur pied de nouveaux véhicules
A cet effet, le Fonds Européen de stabilité financière (FESF) crée en mai 2010 est une société de droit privé basée au Luxembourg, dont les actionnaires sont justement les 16 Etats de la zone euro.

Pour bénéficier de la notation AAA, 100 euros émis doivent être garantis par 120 euros. C'est ce que les experts appellent le mécanisme de rehaussement.

Ce qui veut dire que les 440 milliards d'euros de garanties ne permettent d'émettre que 83% de ce montant, soit 365 milliards d'euros. En pratique, c'est moins aujourd'hui puisqu'il faut exclure les garanties apportées par les Etats secourus ainsi que les montants déjà émis pour financer les plans de sauvetage.

Le Mécanisme Européen de Stabilité Financière (MESF) devrait prendre le relais du FESF à partir de la mi-2013. La capacité de prêt effective sera de 500 milliards d'euros pour un capital de 700 milliards d'euros ; assurant ainsi un coussin potentiel de 40% à cette structure. Ce niveau de garantie ou "sur collatéralisation" devrait permettre au MESF d'obtenir la note AAA.

Sur ces 700 milliards d'euros, 80 milliards d'euros seront effectivement émis -- donc empruntés -- par le nouveau véhicule. Ils correspondent à du capital souscrit par les Etats membres en fonction de leur poids économique :

- 21,7 milliards d'euros pour l'Allemagne
- 16,3 milliards d'euros pour la France
- 14,3 milliards d'euros pour l'Italie
- 9,5 milliards d'euros pour l'Espagne.

Ces sommes viennent alourdir l'endettement de ces pays.

Les 620 milliards d'euros restants n'existent, quant à eux, pas du tout puisqu'ils seront composés de garanties et de capital non-souscrit (ce que l'on appelle encore dans le jargon le callable capital. Il se transformera en capital à souscrire dès qu'il faudra aider des Etats non encore secourus et surtout dès que les 80 milliards auront été émis et versés).

En d'autres termes, plus ça ira mal, plus il faudra transformer ce capital non souscrit en capital à souscrire et plus l'endettement des pays de la zone s'accroîtra.

Belle mutualisation du risque qui ne pourra à terme que provoquer des tensions sur les taux longs de la zone, y compris ceux des pays jugés les plus vertueux aujourd'hui.

Troisième source également utilisée pour le financement des plans de sauvetage, la mobilisation de ressources "monétaires". A la différence des ressources empruntées et donc émises sur les marchés par les véhicules décrits ci-dessus, ces ressources existent déjà puisqu'elles sont assises sur les droits de tirage spéciaux du FMI.

Chaque pays dispose au FMI en fonction de son poids économique de ce que l'on appelle les droits de tirage spéciaux (DTS). Ces droits ont été crées en 1969 pour jouer un rôle de réserves de change additionnelles pour les Etats. Ainsi l'Allemagne dispose de 13 milliards de DTS, la France de 10,7 milliards et, pour l'ensemble de la zone, ce montant s'élève à 50,4 milliards.

La parité actuelle se situe autour de 1,15 euro pour 1 DTS. Nous avons donc un total de 58 milliards d'euros. Il existe une règle qui fixe à 10 fois les quotas la limite de financement, cela signifie que l'ensemble de la zone euro a théoriquement la capacité de lever jusqu'à 580 milliards d'euros. Pour les pays aidés, on peut dire que ce matelas de 10 fois a été largement utilisé.

Par exemple, le financement par le FMI de 30 milliards d'euros (dont 10 milliards dès 2010) pour le plan grec de mai 2010 sous la forme d'un accord de confirmation équivaut à 3 200% (32 fois) de la quote-part de la Grèce dans le Fonds. Autant dire que le FMI finance la Grèce en utilisant les quote-parts d'autres pays de la zone.

Situation similaire pour le Portugal puisque dans le cadre du plan de sauvetage de mai 2011, le Mécanisme Elargi de Crédit du Fonds représente 2 300% (23 fois) de la quote-part du pays dans le FMI.

Tout cet argent émis ou tiré sur des quotes-parts est généralement distribué au fil de l'eau avec, en principe, un suivi de la mise en oeuvre des réformes structurelles et de l'assainissement budgétaire.

Par exemple, pour la Grèce, l'aide européenne du plan de mai 2010 prend la forme de prêts uniques gérés par la Commission européenne avec des décaissements trimestriels. Aujourd'hui, la Grèce a déjà touché 53 milliards du plan de 110 milliards. Avant même la finalisation d'un nouveau plan d'aide, l'actualité porte aujourd'hui sur le déblocage par la zone euro et le FMI, prévu au départ début juin 2011, de 12 milliards d'euros. Ceci correspond à la cinquième tranche du prêt accordé au pays en mai 2010.

Dans la réalité des choses et malgré la médiatisation du conditionnement de ces aides, l'argent est majoritairement emprunté puis distribué sans audit véritable des mesures mises en oeuvre en contrepartie.

Deuxième question : ces milliards suffisent-ils à réguler le problème de solvabilité des Etats concernés ?

Les autorités politiques ont souvent évoqué la possibilité d'un soutien illimité aux pays en difficulté. Tout ceci n'a de sens que si ces pays doivent faire face à une simple crise de liquidité. En revanche, si un pays insolvable reçoit un soutien "infini" de la part d'investisseurs publics, il reste insolvable. La crise est seulement repoussée dans le temps.

Pour succéder au FESF en 2013, les gouvernements de la zone euro veulent s'orienter vers la création de ce MESF, sorte de "FMI européen", capable de prêter aux pays des montants très importants puisque ses ressources sont monétaires et non empruntées sur les marchés obligataires comme celles du FESF. Il s'agit encore et toujours d'acheter du temps mais en quantité de plus en plus considérable.

En tout cas, ce qui est connu précisément aujourd'hui auprès de sources officielles ce sont les besoins d'emprunts des pays périphérique en difficultés budgétaires réelles ou potentielles sur l'horizon 2011-2013 (2013 correspond à l'échéance officielle du FESF) :
- Grèce : 78 milliards d'euros
- Portugal : 25 milliards d'euros
- Espagne : 135 milliards d'euros
- Irlande : 16 milliards d'euros.

L'addition est donc de 254 milliards d'euros. A comparer aux 365 milliards d'euros du FESF, moins ce qui a déjà été distribué.

Attention donc à la contagion à l'Espagne compte tenu de sa taille.

Troisième question : ces milliards mettent-ils à l'abri les banques en cas de besoins de recapitalisation urgente ?

Les plans de sauvetage ont aussi pour objet d'assurer la stabilité des systèmes financiers nationaux. Cela passe souvent, comme en Irlande, par la création de bad banks pour transférer des banques vers des structures étatiques les actifs toxiques. Ceci permet de libérer des fonds propres. Ce principe s'inspire de ce qui a été fait en Suède, aux Etats-Unis et au Japon à la fin des années 1980 et au début des années 1990. Des ressources doivent aussi être prévues pour garantir les passifs bancaires (c'est-à-dire les dettes émises par les banques).

Il est naturellement difficile d'estimer les impacts de krachs financiers sur des dépréciations d'actifs de banques fragiles donc sur leurs besoins de recapitalisations supplémentaires inattendues.

Même avec des stress tests crédibles, la vraie question est aujourd'hui de savoir si les Etats les plus fragiles seraient capables de venir sauver à nouveau leur système bancaire national, à l'instar de ce qui s'était passé à l'automne 2008.

La réponse est évidemment non, ce qui signifie que les tailles du FESF et du futur MESF sont probablement mal calibrées. On sait, en effet, que ces tailles ont été fixées en fonction des besoins de financement connus des Etats. Mais des besoins additionnels et surtout inattendus de financement liés à la situation de certaines banques européennes, voire des besoins aujourd'hui "cachés" de certaines collectivités publiques (en Espagne et même en France) pourraient nécessiter un redimensionnement des fonds européens.

Pour assurer un financement adéquat du dispositif de soutien à l'Europe, il faudrait mettre sur la table peut-être jusqu'à 2 000 milliards d'euros selon certains. Bien évidemment, cette somme ne serait pas dépensée et ce serait juste une réserve de liquidités, encore que...

Encore une fois, ces montants suffisent juste pour parer au plus pressé, la résolution de problèmes de liquidité, et non pour traiter du problème véritable, la solvabilité.

Mory Doré est un professionnel des marchés financiers depuis plus de 20 ans ayant exercé différentes fonctions dans plusieurs grands groupes bancaires : économiste de marché ; trader et arbitragiste sur produits dérivés de taux d'intérêt ; trésorier et responsable de l'allocation des excédents de fonds propres ; responsable gestion financière.

Aujourd'hui, il est responsable du département des risques financiers dans un grand groupe bancaire mutualiste.

Durant ces 10 dernières années, il est un interlocuteur privilégié de la gestion financière et des risques financiers de son établissement auprès de différentes instances et institutions : commissaires aux comptes, Commission bancaire, Comité d'audit et Comité d'entreprise.

Il possède un diplôme de statisticien économiste de l'école nationale de la Statistique et de L'Administration économique ainsi qu'une maîtrise d'Econométrie de l'Université de Bourgogne (Dijon).

Mory Doré, MoneyWeek - La Vie Financière, 4-07-2011.

Nouriel Roubini Is All Wrong About China

Shaun Rein, 06.15.11 (Forbes) - He bases his pessimistic forecast on phantom facts.

The famed bearish economist Nouriel Roubini has been making waves recently by siding with China bears like Jim Chanos and saying that China will run into big economic problems in 2013. To buttress his argument, he has been telling anecdotes from a recent trip to China.

He has been quoted by Reuters as saying, "'I was recently in Shanghai and I took their high-speed train to Hangzhou,' referring to the new Maglev line that has cut traveling time between the two cities from four hours to less than one. 'The brand new high-speed train is half-empty and the brand new station is three-quarters empty. Parallel to that train line, there is also a new highway that looked three-quarters empty. Next to the train station is also the new local airport of Shanghai and you can fly to Hangzhou,' he said. 'There is no rationale for a country at that level of economic development to have not just duplication but triplication of those infrastructure projects.'"

Roubini, who correctly predicted America's housing crisis, is no lightweight economist. If China were building infrastructure projects in triplicate, it might portend that China was overbuilding at a faster pace than Dubai. If that became the case, it could create problems that rarely end well, such as a credit-fueled real estate boom.

However, most of Roubini's conclusions are based on phantom facts, as is his evidence for why China will have economic problems. There is no direct flight between Shanghai and Hangzhou, nor is there a maglev train system connecting the two cities. Shanghai has two, not three, airports, and the last new one opened a dozen years ago, in 1999. Both the Hongqiao and Pudong airports have been adding runways and terminals because the airports are too crowded, contrary to Roubini's suggestions of emptiness. Pudong's passenger and cargo traffic grew 27% in 2010, to 40.6 million passengers. It is now the third busiest airport in the world in terms of freight traffic, with 3,227,914 metric tons handled every year.

That hardly sounds like an underutilized airport with wasted investment in triplicate. Many analysts have turned bearish on China's economy over the last few years because they are concerned about empty apartments, too much debt and overcapacity. However, like Roubini, these analysts surprisingly misunderstand basic facts about income, demographics and investment in these facilities, and they use data points that are simply wrong to lead to their conclusions.

The reality is that most of China's infrastructure spending has created greater business efficiency while maintaining stable employment numbers. There were indeed plans to build a maglev train between Shanghai and Hangzhou, but those plans were scrapped following analysis that indicated it would be a waste of money. Instead, high speed rails were installed. This is a sustainable investment because it improves the linkage between two cities with populations of 24 million and 9 million. Every time I have been on the trains they have been packed to capacity, and I can assure you I have been on them far more often than has Roubini.

Most of China's transportation projects are not like Japan's bridges and highways to nowhere i that connect big cities with hamlets. China' projects improve business efficiency, and they are needed in that still developing economy. China has not yet gotten to where Japan was when it started wasting money on infrastructure projects to get out of its deflationary cycle.

The Chinese government is also severely limiting the number of new automobile license plates it issues, to reduce pollution and congestion. Only 21% of those who applied for a license plate in Beijing in January received one. My firm, the China Market Research Group, estimates that 350 million Chinese now live in households that can afford automobiles, and gross domestic product per capita is rising 10% a year. Per capita GDP more than tripled to USD3,400 at the end of 2010 from $949 in 2000. As a result of the limits on new autos, there is major pent up demand for cars, as incomes continue to rise. Until the restrictions on auto buying are eased, if ever, the demand for high-speed comfortable trains will grow.

China is not immune to economic cycles. It will definitely go through rough patches in the coming years, and housing prices may in fact fall. Despite a relatively efficient bureaucracy, no government can stave off market forces forever, and problems are starting to arise. However, the headwinds are coming from raging inflation, a shrinking labor pool and a weak education system, not from over-construction in infrastructure spending, as Roubini argues. It is important that analysts use real, not phantom, data points to draw conclusions about China.

Shaun Rein is the founder and managing director of the China Market Research Group, a strategic market intelligence firm, and is based in Shanghai. Follow him on Twitter @shaunrein.

Citigroup buys 9.9% stake in Vietnam's Horizon Securities Corp

By Alison Tudor at WSJ; Jul 1, 2011 -- Citigroup Inc. took a stake in a Vietnamese brokerage firm, betting that once the economy's rampant inflation slows, foreign investors will flock back to the communist country.

The New York bank signed a deal Thursday to buy a 9.9% stake in Horizon Securities Corp. for an undisclosed amount, becoming one of a few foreign firms to own a stake in a local broker. Others include Japan's Daiwa Securities Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley.

Citi's purchase comes at a time when Vietnam's economy is floundering. Inflation is running around 20%, a level the World Bank has labeled "intolerable," and the stock market is trading well below its 2007 peak. Labor strikes are spreading.

The government has aggressively moved to reel in inflation by raising interest rates and restricting bank lending. Many small businesses, which make up about 40% of the country's economy, are struggling. When state-run shipbuilder Vinashin defaulted on loan repayments late last year, much foreign capital fled on worries that other firms would follow suit.

Citigroup said it wasn't deterred.

"Fundamentally we're very bullish on Vietnam, despite the short-term pressures on the economy," said Brett Krause, head of Citigroup in Vietnam. He believes the government's policies are starting to have an impact.

Investing is also becoming easier. Vietnam has been gradually opening up its financial-services sector to outsiders since it joined the World Trade Organization in 2007. Foreigners can buy only 49% of a local brokerage, but Vietnam has committed to allowing full ownership by 2012.

The sector also looks ripe for consolidation. The government granted scores of brokerage licenses in recent years, when foreign capital was flooding into the country. But the hundred or so operational securities houses have been struggling because of the stock market's slide.

Ho Chi Minh-based Horizon, founded in 2006, is a privately held firm that provides brokerage and corporate-finance services.

"Arguably now is a good time to come into the market as it starts to consolidate," said Citi's Mr. Krause. If Citi decides to take a larger stake, it will then bring the local broker's technology, service and compliance standards into line with Citi's practices globally, he added.

"This is a platform that we can work together with moving forward," said Mr. Krause.

Investment banks are keen to build their franchises across the Asian-Pacific region to offer investors a one-stop shop in the region and to secure a role in helping Vietnam privatize broad swathes of its economy. The privatization process should give a fillip to the tiny Ho Chi Minh stock exchange, which currently has about 280 companies listed.

Citigroup already has offices in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and offers banking services across the country, including corporate and investment banking. It also offers trading in 10 Asian stock markets, signed a securities joint venture in mainland China this month and opened a research office in the Philippines last year.

Bribe scandal extends to Vietnamese spy colonel

July 4 2011 (Richard Baker and Nick McKenzi, The Age) - AUSTRALIAN trade officials met or spoke with a colonel from a Vietnamese spy agency 18 times before suggesting to a Reserve Bank currency firm that it hire him as an agent in an arrangement that is now expected to lead to more corruption charges as part of the nation's biggest bribery probe.
The Age can also reveal that the federal police investigated an Austrade commissioner, who is still serving in Asia, after uncovering information about Austrade's role in assisting banknote firm Securency International provide overseas travel for Vietnamese officials.

The revelation of Austrade's intimate role in Securency's allegedly corrupt Vietnam dealings comes just hours after German police swooped on a former senior sales executive from Note Printing Australia (NPA), the second RBA banknote company accused of bribing overseas officials.

The dramatic weekend arrest of Christian Boilott over his alleged role in a conspiracy to bribe overseas officials while working for NPA came just before his yacht was to sail in a contest in Boltenhagen, in Germany.
Mr Boilott, whom Australian authorities will seek to extradite, is the ninth man to be charged around the globe for an alleged role in the banknote companies' bribery scandal, with six Victorians and two Malaysians arrested on Friday.

The Vietnamese colonel also suspected of playing a key role in a bribery scheme allegedly driven by Reserve Bank companies Securency and NPA is yet to be questioned by Vietnamese authorities, who have so far declined to assist Australia in the global inquiry.

Former Australian diplomatic and trade officials have privately confirmed that Securency agent Anh Ngoc Luong's status as a colonel in Vietnam's spy agency, the Ministry of Public Security, was well known to the Australian embassy in Hanoi when Austrade suggested Securency appoint him and his company, CFTD, as its agent in 2002.

Information released by Austrade and the Department of Foreign Affairs to Liberal senator Russell Trood shows that Australian officials in Hanoi met or spoke to Luong 18 times between 1999 and 2001.

It is illegal for an Australian company to hire a foreign official as its paid agent, and Luong's appointment is suspected to have begun one of the highest paying bribery arrangements that Securency set up across the globe, paying the colonel up to $20 million, much of it in suspected bribes.

In return, he helped Securency win a massive contract to switch Vietnam's banknotes from paper to plastic.
Australian embassy staff in Hanoi continued to have close dealings, including intimate dinners, with Colonel Luong even after an Austrade commissioner formally warned Canberra and the RBA in 2007 and 2008 that he was a high-ranking Ministry of Public Security officer. The ministry is Vietnam's internal security and counter-espionage agency.

This information was also made available to the Securency board at that time. The board did not ask Securency management to end its arrangement with Colonel Luong.

The Austrade commissioner investigated by the AFP over Securency's Vietnam dealings is understood to have helped arrange visas for Vietnamese officials to enter the United States on a brief Securency-funded holiday.

The Austrade official has not been charged. Other Austrade officials have also given statements to the AFP.
The revelation of Austrade's intimate involvement with Securency's Vietnam affairs is likely to increase pressure on the Gillard government to agree with a push by Greens leader Bob Brown for a parliamentary inquiry into the roles of the trade agency and the RBA in the bribery scandal.

A senior federal government official has told The Age that if an inquiry was held into Austrade's relationship with Securency and Note Printing Australia ''it would emerge that the Australian government has sanctioned and engaged in corruption''.

A high-ranking Austrade manager has separately told The Age that ''in the case of Securency … there is no doubt as to Austrade's complicity as the agency not only made the introductions to CFTD but advised on how to deal with them''.

The RBA owns half of Securency and all of NPA. During the period of the alleged bribery, both companies were chaired by former deputy RBA governor Graeme Thompson and had other senior RBA officials as directors.

In Vietnam, Securency has been charged with bribing former Vietnamese central bank governor Le Duc Thuy by providing a scholarship for his son to study at an exclusive English university. Mr Thuy remains a senior figure in the Vietnamese government and chairs the National Committee for Financial Supervision.

Colonel Luong is believed to have used some of the commissions paid to him and CFTD by Securency to fund the education of Mr Thuy's son. Bribery in Vietnam carries the death penalty.

Austrade deemed the partnership between Securency and Colonel Luong's CFTD firm to be so successful that it presented them with a special export award in 2004.

In November 1999, Colonel Luong was invited to Australia as part of an Austrade seminar on the Vietnam market. In August 2008, he was part of an Australia-Vietnam Joint Trade and Economic Co-operation Committee delegation - months after Austrade's commissioner in Vietnam warned of his links to the Ministry of Public Security. Colonel Luong also attended several lunches and dinners hosted by the Australian embassy.
He twice met embassy officials in the months after The Age broke the Securency bribery story and named him as an agent in May 2009.

The Age has previously reported on internal Austrade documents from 1998 that reveal Colonel Luong was known as having ''family relations in various key [government] ministries''. They also detail how he had a ''well-connected'' father and a ''father-in-law [who] is minister of interior''.

In an interview with a Vietnamese journalist in 2007, Securency executives said the services provided by Colonel Luong and his company primarily involved translation, organising meetings and picking people up from the airport.

The AFP's investigation into Securency and NPA remains ongoing and further charges against other former executives are expected.

Britain's Serious Fraud Office is investigating Securency's contracts in Nigeria, which involved nearly $20 million in commission payments to a network of agents and offshore bank accounts.

Austrade declined to comment, citing the ongoing police probe.